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This paper argues that expectations are an important element that need to be in-
cluded into the analysis of the e⁄ects of the minimum wage on employment. We show
in a standard matching model that these e⁄ects are higher the lower is the likelihood
associated to the minimum wage variation. This property also helps explaining the con-
troversial results found in the empirical literature. When the policy is anticipated, the
observed e⁄ect at the time of the actual variation is small and hard to identify. The model
is tested on Spanish data, taking advantage of the unexpected change in the minimum
wage following the election of Zapatero in 2004.
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11 Introduction
Minimum wages were ￿rst introduced in Australia and New Zealand in the late 19th century
and are now in force in more than 90% of all countries. Despite its widespread use, the
minimum wage is a debated issue. Its supporters assert that it helps prevent the excess of
exploitation in the labor market and increases the living standards of the lowest paid up to
some minimum acceptable standards. Detractors claim that the minimum wage may price
low-skill workers out of market, harming rather than helping the poorest workers.
Economic theory does not provide a clear prediction about the employment e⁄ects of the
minimum wage: in a competitive labor market a binding minimum wage reduces employment,
but this is not necessary the case in a monopsonistic labor market, where the higher wage
may attract more workers without dampening the labor demand.
The empirical literature is large and can be divided in two waves: the ￿rst one ending
in 1982, with the review of Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982); and the second one, the
"New Minimum Wage Research", starting in 1991 and summarized in Neumark and Wascher
(2007).
The former bulk of studies relies mainly on time-series variation in the minimum wage in
US and aggregate data and has built a consensus around the idea that minimum wages reduce
teenage employment. The latter uses cross-section and panel-data to identify the e⁄ects of
the minimum wage in several countries with controversial results. Long panel studies that
incorporate both country and time variation in minimum wages tend, on the whole, to ￿nd
negative and statistically signi￿cant employment e⁄ects from minimum wage increases, while
the majority of the U.S. studies that ￿nd zero or positive e⁄ects of the minimum wage on
low-skill employment were either short panel data studies or case studies of a state-speci￿c
change in the minimum wage.1
This paper proposes a mechanism capable of reconciling those con￿ icting ￿ndings. The
key ingredient is the distinction between expected and unexpected changes in the minimum
wage. Minimum wage changes can often be foreseen. This is particularly true in countries
such as France and Spain, where the statutory minimum wage is set to be updated every year,
or in Italy and Germany, that have no minimum wage laws but rely on collective agreements
between employer groups and trade unions, renegotiated at de￿ned dates. In the light of
these features, the minimum wage policy cannot be considered as an unpredictable shock.
If agents are rational, they will form expectations about minimum wage movements and
adjust their current behavior to the future economic environment. They have the incentive
to anticipate the policy because the pro￿tability of an employment relationship depends
also on the future wage. When the minimum wage is expected to increase, the present
value of a job decreases and less vacancies will be posted. Furthermore, some employer-
employee relationships may turn unpro￿table at the higher wage and will be broken. In a
world characterized by employment protection regulation dismissing a worker is expensive,
and ￿rms may ￿nd more convenient not to hire those marginal workers and save on future
costs. When the minimum wage actually increases, the employment adjustment will be small
because it has been partly anticipated. We argue that the empirical literature has not been
1In their review, Neumark and Wascher (2007) argue that the lack of signi￿cant employment losses found
in some analysis could be due to the short time horizon cutting o⁄ part of the adjustment process.
2able to ￿nd conclusive results because the minimum wage variations under analysis were
expected, so that the actual employment e⁄ect was relatively small and hard to identify.
Viceversa, when the policy is unexpected, it will have stronger real e⁄ects.
The model we develop is an extension of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model.
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions, heterogeneous stochastic
matching, and endogenous separations. Expectations are taken into account: agents know
that the minimum wage may increase in the future. In this framework, we compare expected
and unexpected changes in the minimum wage. Their e⁄ects on employment are not di⁄erent
in the magnitude, but in the timing: the former in￿ uence the labor market outcomes both
before and after the actual variation, while the latter has no anticipated e⁄ect.
The predictions of the model are tested on Spanish data. Spain provides a suitable
environment in order to test the role played by expectations. The Spanish statutory minimum
wage is set to be updated yearly, therefore changes in this policy should be predictable. But
this is not always the case: the increase in the Spanish minimum wage following the election of
JosØ Luis Rodr￿guez Zapatero was largely unexpected. Thus we can estimate and compare
the e⁄ect of the unexpected rise in the minimum wage, after Zapatero election, with the
expected variations. Our analysis relies on individual data from the Economically Active
Population Survey, 2000-2006. This longitudinal dataset is suitable to study not only the
employment e⁄ect, but also the evolution of ￿ ows. The analysis of ￿ ows allows to identify
the exact source for employment changing and to better appreciate the role of the minimum
wage even when the net disemployment e⁄ect is negligible.2
Not all workers are a⁄ected by the minimum wage, but only those with lower bargaining
power or lower productivity. The empirical literature typically identify the a⁄ected group
with the youth, and a di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach is implemented using the adult as a
control group. But not all the young workers are actually low-paid.3 Thus we test several
speci￿cations with more restrictive treatment and control groups.
Our results show that the employment e⁄ect depends on the nature of the minimum wage
variation: unexpected changes lead to a reduction in employment in the period following
the actual change; whereas expected variations have e⁄ect on impact and may decrease
employment ex-ante, but do not have ex-post e⁄ects. The increase in ￿ ows out of employment
is greater in case of unexpected policy, as predicted by the theoretical model. Temporary
workers turn out to be the most a⁄ected, while separations do not signi￿cantly increase for
permanent workers.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a review of the literature on the
minimum wage. The role of expectations is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the
model, both with and without expectations, and compare the resulting disemployment e⁄ect
of the minimum wage. The empirical analysis is detailed in Section 5 and Section 6. Section
7 concludes.
2The advantages of analyzing ￿ ows have been ￿rst recognized in Portugal and Cardoso (2006).
3See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for a brief discussion.
32 The employment e⁄ect of the minimum wage
The minimum wage policy is mainly a redistributive instrument; nevertheless economic lit-
erature focuses on its employment e⁄ects.4 The simple model of competitive labor market
predicts that, when the minimum wage exceeds the competitive wage, a further increase in
the minimum wage leads to higher unemployment. Similar conclusions are drawn from a
basic matching model, where equilibrium conditions require a rise in the minimum wage to
be compensated by a lower market tightness ￿that means lower vacancy posting and lower
job creation. However there is no clear evidence in support of the disemployment e⁄ect of
the minimum wage.
Individuals most likely to be employed at the minimum wage are the recent labor mar-
ket entrants. Empirical studies typically limit their attention to young workers. Di⁄erent
econometric strategies have been used to asses the impact of the minimum wage on youth
employment. The First Wave of the Minimum Wage Research uses mainly time-series and
aggregate data to estimate correlations between employment and the minimum wage. They
generally ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of the minimum wage on youth employment, as summarized
by Brown et al. (1982):
"time-series studies typically ￿nd that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage
reduces teenage employment by one to three percent" (p. 524).
But this approach has been widely criticized. The use of aggregate data may leave out
many relevant variables, giving rise to spurious correlation.5
The New Minimum Wage Research relies on case studies and panel data, with controver-
sial results. In a series of papers, Card and Krueger (1994, 2000) exploit the 1992 increase in
New Jersey￿ s minimum wage as a natural experiment and estimate its e⁄ect on the fast-food
employment. They implement a di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach, including restaurant in
eastern Pennsylvania as a control group. Their estimates show either no signi￿cant e⁄ect
of the increase in the minimum wage on employment, either a positive e⁄ect. These results
have been questioned by Neumark and Wascher (2000). They replicate the analysis of Card
and Krueger (1994) replacing their survey based data with administrative payroll records,
and ￿nd a negative e⁄ect on New Jersey￿ s employment relative to Pennsylvania. But the
debate is still open: Card and Krueger (2000) replied to Neumark and Wascher￿ s criticism
and con￿rmed their previous results, even using payroll data.
Some studies in the New Minimum Wage Research exploit panel data to identify the
employment e⁄ects of the minimum wage. For instance, Card (1992) studies the April 1990
increase in the federal minimum wage over di⁄erent states, taking advantage of the variation
in the distribution of wages. Low-wage regions should be more a⁄ected by the minimum
wage change. Regressing the change in state teen employment on the fraction of a⁄ected
4Notably, some exceptions are Flinn (2006) and Boadway and Cu⁄ (2001) that also analyze the e⁄ect of
the minimum wage on welfare.
5The shortcomings of the time-series approach are discussed in detailed in Card and Krueger (1995). They
claim that minimum wage e⁄ects on employment should ideally be examined using microdata sources and
a natural-experiment methodology. Furthermore, they argue that only substantial changes in the minimum
wage can be sensibly used to estimate the employment e⁄ect.
4workers (i.e. teenagers who earned between the old and the new minimum wage in 1989),
and controls, Card does not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the 1990 minimum wage increase. On
the other side, Neumark and Wascher support the disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum
wage in a series of papers (1992, 2002, 2007b). An important di⁄erence among these studies
is the measure of the minimum wage: Card considers the fraction of workers at or near the
minimum wage, while Neumark and Wascher make use of the Kaitz index. The Kaitz index is
a coverage-weighted minimum wage relative to the average wage and it is the most common
measure of the minimum wage. Nonetheless many concerns have been raised with regard to
its computation and its suitability to account for the minimum wage impact. Dolado et al.
(1996) and Neumark and Wascher (2007) discuss the issue from several perspectives, but the
suitability of the Kaitz index is still an open question.
In the end, the empirical literature has not been able, yet, to reach an agreement upon
the e⁄ect of the minimum wage on employment, neither to establish the correct way to
handle this issue.
How does economic theory explain the empirical controversial ￿ndings? Few cogent
models have been proposed. One is the monopsony model, largely exploited and extended
by Alan Manning(1995, 2003, 2004) in several papers. Firms are assumed to have some
power in retaining workers and, therefore, some discretion over the wages they pay. If the
minimum wage lies between the monopolistic wage and the competitive wage, a rise in its
level may increase employment enhancing labor supply without dampening labor demand,
but lowering ￿rms￿rent. Otherwise the minimum wage has a negative e⁄ect on employment.
Monopsony can account for both positive and negative e⁄ects of the minimum wage, but
it has been questioned the coherence of this framework with the low wage labor markets.
Those markets are characterized by a large number of relatively small employers and high
worker mobility; they are closer to perfect competition then to monopsony.
An alternative to monopsonistic power is a version of the e¢ ciency wage model developed
by Rebitzer and Taylor (1996). Employers have an incentive to limit employment in order
to minimize the supervision cost, that is assumed to be increasing in ￿rm￿ s size. Higher
minimum wage helps to solve the moral hazard problem: the cost of job loss to workers
currently employed increases with the wage paid, so that the threat to dismiss shirking
workers becomes more e⁄ective and lower resources need to be devoted to supervision and
may be used to increase employment.
A matching model with endogenous search e⁄ort is also capable to produce di⁄erent
employment e⁄ect of the minimum wage. On one side, an increase in the minimum wage
rises the value of working and may provide an incentive for unemployed to exert more e⁄ort
in searching for a job. On the other side, the ￿rm￿ s rent diminishes and lower vacancy are
posted, so that the probability to get a job decreases with opposite e⁄ect on the search e⁄ort.
When the impact on search e⁄ort is positive, the matching process becomes more e¢ cient
and may compensate for the reduction in job openings.6
No doubt the employment e⁄ects of the minimum wage depend on the characteristics of
the labor market to which it applies.
6See Flinn (2006) for an empirical analysis of the e⁄ect of the minimum wage on search e⁄ort.
5In this paper we propose a di⁄erent mechanism to account for the wide range of empir-
ical results. Instead of focusing on the characteristics of the labor market, we look at the
characteristic of the policy under analysis, the minimum wage variations. A change in the
minimum wage may be expected or not by agents, with di⁄erent employment e⁄ects. In par-
ticular, we show that disemployment is higher in case of an unexpected change. Still, labor
marker characteristics contribute to shape the employment e⁄ect of the minimum wage.7
We argue that the empirical literature was not able to ￿nd conclusive results because the
minimum wage variations under analysis were expected, so that the actual employment e⁄ect
was relatively small and hard to identify. Marginal di⁄erences in the econometric strategy,
in the dataset, or in the construction of the minimum wage index are then able to produce
con￿ icting estimates. A clear example is the endless debate among Card and Krueger and
Neumark and Wascher about the disemployment e⁄ect of the 1992 increase in New Jersey￿ s
minimum wage. That policy had been scheduled and announced in early 1990, two years
before the actual change. The advance announcement allowed Card and Krueger to collect
data pre and post the minimum wage variation, but it also allowed ￿rms and workers to
adjust their behavior. We expect that most of the employment e⁄ect had already occurred
by the 1992 and the reaction to the actual increase in the minimum wage was little. In
this case, estimates may not be robust to small variation in the data or in the econometric
strategy.
3 The role of expectations
The role of expectations in shaping the behavior of economic agents is well documented
and has been extensively used to understand a variety of situations in which speculation
about the future is a crucial factor in determining current action. The theory of rational
expectations was ￿rst proposed by John F. Muth in the early sixties and, in 1995, Robert
E. Jr. Lucas won a Nobel prize for his studies on expectations and monetary policy.
It is widely recognized that the e⁄ect of a policy depends on agents￿expectations. The
"policy ine⁄ectiveness proposition" by Lucas (1972) states the neutrality of economic policies
that have their e⁄ects solely by inducing forecast errors. But also policies that operate
by a⁄ecting incentives have to take into account agents￿expectations. For instance, the
permanent income theory of consumption predicts that a tax-cut is going to have only a
marginal e⁄ect on consumption if agents expect it to be temporary.
Despite that, expectations have not been introduced in the analysis of the minimum
wage policy. This is surprising, especially because variations in the minimum wage are often
scheduled and announced in advance.
Table 1 shows that in many countries the minimum wage is revised on regular basis,
7Actually, in order for expectations to play a role, we need to assume some form of rigidities in the market.
In a perfectly competitive market, an increase in the minimum wage always implies a fall in employment ￿
regardless of expectations ￿ because labor demand and labor supply depends only on current price and
productivity. We consider matching frictions, so that the ￿rm￿ s current optimization problem depends also
on future values and expectations.
6typically once a year.8 The frequency of adjustment is ￿xed by law, when the minimum
wage is statutory, or by collective contracts, if the minimum wage is negotiated. Also the
criteria guiding the minimum wage revision are often stated by law. This is the case in
Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands, France, Portugal, Spain, Canada and other countries,
where the minimum wage is updated taking into account in￿ ation, or the level of average
wages, productivity, or other indicators.9
In the light of these features, the minimum wage policy cannot be considered as an
unpredictable shock. Agents operating in the labor market have the possibility and the
incentive to form expectations about the timing and the magnitude of future minimum wage
changes, because the pro￿tability of an employment relationship depends also on the future
wage. Expected variations in the minimum wage a⁄ect the current value of a job and, in
turn, the job creation and job destruction decisions. Then, when the minimum wage actually
increases, the employment adjustment will be small because it has been partly anticipated.
4 The model
The model is built to mimic the labor market of low wage workers. It is characterized by
search and matching frictions, heterogeneous stochastic matches and endogenous separations.
The wage is ￿xed at the minimum wage level.
Frictions are summarized by the matching function m(v;u), with constant returns to





v , respectively. Call market tightness the ratio between vacancies over unemploy-
ment, ￿ = v
u. The higher is ￿, the higher is the probability to ￿nd a job for a worker, p, and
the lower is the probability to meet a worker for a ￿rm, q.
The productivity of a match is a stochastic drawing, x, from a known probability distri-
bution H (x), at the time of the meeting. Observing x, the ￿rm-worker pair decides whether
or not to form the match and start production. Low realization of x may be rejected because
of the prospect of a better job match in the future. The minimum level of productivity such
that the match is formed is called hiring standard, a.
Match productivity x can be hit by a shock with frequency ￿ and the new productivity
level is drawn from H (x). Job separations occurs if the new productivity drawing is lower
than the productivity threshold d. A match may also be destroyed when the minimum wage
increases and, at the new wage, the job is no more pro￿table. In case of separation, a ￿ring
tax F is paid by the ￿rm.10 Note that, due to the separation cost F, the productivity
threshold d is lower than the hiring standard a.
8The updating process concerns the nominal minimum wage. The real minimum wage varies continuously,
due to in￿ ation, and these variations may be expected or not. In the past two decades, in￿ ation has been
relatively low and stable, and we could argue that the real minimum wage changes were predictable and
expected. In the model, we will abstract from changes caused only by in￿ ation because they are marginal
and not likely to signi￿cantly a⁄ect agents￿behavior.
9Source: ILO database on the minimum wage policy.
10Employment protection legislation takes several forms in di⁄erent countries: requirement to give a notice
period to the worker before dismissal becomes e⁄ective; severance payments; possibility for the worker to
contest the dismissal in front of a court; etc. Most of the literature consider only the cost incurred by the
￿rm and paid outside of the match, which can be modeled as a tax. This is necessary in order for the
7Firms know that the minimum wage may increase, and assign probability ￿ to this
event. Over time expectations can be updated so that ￿ changes. We distinguish three
phases. Initially, agents do not expect the minimum wage to rise, state 0, the wage is at
level w1 and the expectation parameter is ￿0 = 0. In state 1 the subjective probability ￿
increases to ￿1 > ￿0,11 the wage is still w1 but it is expected to increase in the future with
a positive probability ￿1. In the real world, expectations may be revised due to political
announcements of a future variation in the minimum wage, or due to changes in the economic
situation or in the political support such that the likelihood of an increase in the minimum
wage varies. When the minimum wage actually rises, state 2, the expected event has taken
place, so that the wage change to w2 > w1 and ￿2 is set back to zero.
The disemployment e⁄ect is analyzed in the two cases of expected and unexpected vari-
ation of the minimum wage.
4.1 Value functions
There is a continuum of identical households with total mass equal to one and a continuum
of identical ￿rms, each one holding one job. Each worker receives the minimum wage w:
Given our assumptions, the value of a ￿lled job reads:12
rJi (x) = x ￿ wi + ￿
R xu
d [Ji (s) ￿ Ji (x)]dH (s) + ￿H (d)[Vi ￿ F ￿ Ji (x)]
+￿i maxfVi ￿ F ￿ Ji (x);J2 (x) ￿ Ji (x)g i = 0;1
(1)
rJ2 (x) = x ￿ w2 + ￿
Z xu
d
[J2 (s) ￿ J2 (x)]dH (s) + ￿H (d)[V2 ￿ F ￿ J2 (x)] (2)
where w0 = w1, w2 > w1, ￿0 = 0, ￿1 > 0.
A job produces x and costs w, with probability ￿ it is hit by a shock and its productivity
is drawn from H (x) over the support
￿
xl;xu￿
. If the new productivity is below the threshold
d, the job is destroyed and the ￿rm gets a new vacancy V and pays F, otherwise the job is
continued. In state 1, ￿rms know that, with probability ￿1, the minimum wage will increase
to w2 and the value of a job moves to J2 (x). The job is destroyed if its new value is lower
then the ￿ring cost. Note that Ji (x) is decreasing in the wage w and in the expectation
parameter ￿.
The value of a vacancy is:
rVi = ￿k + q (￿)
Z xu
a
[Ji (s) ￿ Vi]dH (s) i = 0;1;2 (3)
employment protection legislation not to be overruled by an appropriate wage contract. In this model wages
are exogenously ￿xed at the minimum wage level, therefore it is irrelevant whether the cost F is transferred
to the worker or paid to a third part.
11We could assume that the initial subjective probability ￿0 is positive. Then we could compare the case
in which expectations do not change with the case with updated expectations, from ￿0 to ￿1. Here we set
￿0 = 0 because we want to compare an expected increase in the minimum wage, ￿ > 0, with an unexpected
increase in the minimum wage, ￿ = 0. In order for these two policies to be comparable, we need to start from
the same state of the world, i.e. ￿0 = 0. Implications are qualitatively the same with ￿0 = 0 or ￿0 > 0, as
long as ￿1 > ￿0.
12All the value functions presented in this section are at the steady state.
8where k is the cost of posting a vacancy. The match productivity is drawn by H (x). Condi-
tional on meeting a worker, with probability q (￿), the match is formed and production takes
place if the observed productivity is high enough, i.e. x is higher than a.
Note that, in this simple framework, we abstract from the behavior of workers. We
assume that w is bigger than the workers￿ ￿ ow outside option, so that they are always
willing to form a match and to continue it.
Firms post vacancies as long as their value is positive. Free entry ensures that, in equi-
librium, the value of a vacant position is zero, i.e. Vi = 0. When a worker and a ￿rm meet,
they observe the match speci￿c productivity x and decide whether or not to form the match.
Given wage rigidity, it could happen that the match is pro￿table for the worker but not for
the employer. Therefore, the match is formed only if the ￿rm￿ s surplus, J ￿ V , is positive.
The hiring standard solves J (a) = 0 and gives the lower bound for acceptable matches. Once
the match is formed, the employment protection regulation becomes binding and the ￿rm￿ s
outside option reduces from V to V ￿ F. Therefore a job is destroyed only when its value
falls below ￿F. The continuation decision is taken comparing the current productivity of
the match with the threshold d. In turn, d is obtained from the condition J (d) = ￿F.
4.2 Expected increase in the minimum wage
We de￿ne an increase in the minimum wage as expected if it has been announced or if some
exogenous events ￿for instance, the party in power changes from the right wing to the left ￿
increase the likelihood of a change in the wage policy.13 Recall that there are three states of
the world, characterized by di⁄erent wages w and expectation parameters ￿. Expectations
introduce interdependency among states. In particular, employment decisions taken in state
1 depends also on the value of matches in state 2.
In the following, we derive the equilibrium conditions and analyze the steady states and
the transitions among states.
4.2.1 Equilibrium conditions
Let￿ s solve the ￿rm￿ s problem backward. Substituting the value functions in state 2, namely
equations 2 and 3, into the free entry condition, V2 = 0, the match formation condition,
J2 (a2) = 0, and the job destruction condition, J2 (d2) = ￿F, we get the equilibrium condi-
tions:
13Note that, even if the minimum wage variation has been announced, this does not necessarily imply
certainty about the future change. The evolution of the economic situation or of the political support may
induce the government (or the unions, if the minimum wage is negotiated) to revise the annouced wage
change.
An example is the 1992 increase in the New Jersey￿ s minimum wage up to $5.05 per hour. That variation
had been scheduled in 1990, but the worsening of the New Jersey￿ s economy rose concerns about the potential
adverse impact of a higher minimum wage. The state legislature voted in March 1992 to phase in the planned
increase over two years, but the vote fell just short of the margin required to override a gubernatorial veto,
and the Governor allowed the $5.05 rate to go into e⁄ect on April 1. In the end, the minimum wage increase
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(s ￿ d2)dH (s) (6)
Let￿ s call these conditions JC, MF and JD, respectively. The solution to the system of three
equations gives the hiring standard a, the job destruction threshold d, and market tightness
￿. Note that a and d are increasing in w: a higher labor cost makes ￿rms more choosy about
forming and continuing a match. In contrast, ￿ is decreasing w: for any productivity level,
the value of a ￿lled job is lower, less vacancies are posted, and the labor market tightness ￿
diminishes.
In state 1 agents takes into account the future variation in the value of the match, and
J1 (x) depends on the value of a ￿lled position in state 2. From equation 1, we have:
rJ1 (x) =
(
x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d1 [J1 (s) ￿ J1 (x)]dH (s) ￿ [￿H (d1) + ￿1][F + J1 (x)] if x < d2
x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d1 [J1 (s) ￿ J1 (x)]dH (s) ￿ ￿H (d1)[F + J1 (x)] + ￿1 [J2 (x) ￿ J1 (x)] if x ￿ d2
(7)
Equation 7 is depicted in Figure 1 together with the value function of a job in state 2.
The job value in state 1 is a piecewise function that changes slope at x = d2. The ￿rst
segment pertains to the low productivity matches, x < d2, that won￿ t be pro￿table after
the minimum wage shock and will be destroyed. The second segment represents the high
productivity matches, x > d2, that will be continued after the policy shock.
Note that the value of a job in state 1 is always higher than the respective value in state
2 because, at least in the current period, ￿rms pay a lower wage. Therefore the productivity
thresholds a1 and d1 are unambiguously smaller than a2 and d2. The exact location of J1 (x)
depends on the value of the parameters of the model, in particular w1;w2 and F. Figure 1
shows two cases: JA
1 (x) and JB
1 (x). In case A the increase in the minimum wage causes
the destruction of newly formed jobs, aA
1 < d2. In case B the initial hiring standard fully
anticipate the future rise in the reservation productivity, so that matches unpro￿table in
state 2 are not even formed in state 1, aB
1 > d2. It can be proved that J1 (x) falls in case A
if the following condition is satis￿ed:
(r + ￿ + ￿)F < C (8)
where C = w2￿w1+ ￿
r+￿+￿
R d2
d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)+ ￿
r+￿
hR xu
d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿
R xu
d2 (s ￿ d2)dH (s)
i
.
Intuitively, when the increase in the minimum wage is high with respect to the ￿ring cost
F (case A), it is convenient to form some matches that will be destroyed after the policy
shock, aA
1 < d2,because the actual saving ￿the lower wage paid to the worker plus the value
of production undertaken in state 1 ￿is higher than the future cost of separation. Viceversa,
10when F is high with respect to the minimum wage variation, it is optimal to form only highly
productive matches that will survive the policy shock, aB
1 > d2.14 Regardless of the exact
value of J1 (x), it is always true that the hiring standard a and the destruction threshold d
are lower in state 1 than in state 2; and the market tightness ￿ is higher.
In state 0, agents do not expect the minimum wage to rise, i.e. they assign probability
￿0 = 0 to this event. The value functions in state 0 are equal to the value functions in state
2, apart from the wage, which is w1 < w2. The solution of the equilibrium conditions gives
the two productivity threshold, a0 and d0, that are lower then the respective values in state
1 and state 2, whereas ￿0 is higher.15
Knowing a, d, ￿, we can compute the steady state unemployment level:
ui =
￿H (di)
￿H (di) + ￿iq (￿i)[1 ￿ H (ai)]
i = 0;1;2 (9)
where ￿H (di) is the job destruction rate, de￿ned as the ratio between total job destruction
to employment, and ￿iq (￿i)[1 ￿ H (ai)] is the job ￿nding rate, i.e. the ratio between total job
creation to unemployment.16 Unemployment is increasing in the job destruction threshold,
d, and in the hiring standard, a, and it is decreasing in the market tightness, ￿. It follows
that the unemployment level is greater in state 1 than in state 0, and it is even higher in
state 2.
4.2.2 Job ￿ ows and unemployment dynamics
We showed in the previous section that both the updating of expectations and the actual
rise in the minimum wage have a negative e⁄ect on the job value of matches for any given
productivity level. The comparison across steady state give us the following:
a0 < a1 < a2
d0 < d1 < d2




u0 < u1 < u2 (10)
Moving from one state to the other the expected labor cost increases, then higher productivity
will be required to form ￿higher hiring standard a ￿and to continue a match ￿higher job
destruction threshold d ￿and less vacancies will be posted ￿higher market tightness ￿. As
a result, steady state unemployment increases.
14See Appendix A for a formal proof.
15The equilibrium conditions are formally derived in Appendix A.
16Equation 9 is obtained by setting to zero the change in unemployment:
_ u = ￿H (d)(1 ￿ u) ￿ ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)]u
where ￿H (d)(1 ￿ u) is the job destruction and ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)]u measures the mass of job created. Recall
that q (￿) is the probability of a ￿rm to meet a worker, but not all meetings lead to a match, only those with
productivity higher than a, that is [1 ￿ H (a)].
11How does unemployment move from one steady state to the other? In general, the
dynamics of unemployment is given by the di⁄erence between in￿ ows, job destruction, and
out￿ ows, match formation, of workers from the pool:
_ u = ￿H (d)(1 ￿ u) ￿ ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)]u (11)
In steady state the two ￿ ows compensate each other and unemployment stays constant. The
change in expectations and the increase in the wage act as a shock to the value functions,
so that previous equilibrium parameters ￿ a, d, ￿ ￿ do not satisfy anymore equilibrium
conditions JC, MF and JD. To ensure that agents are optimizing also out of the steady
state, the key parameters as to vary in accordance with the shock. This in turn unbalances
in￿ ows and out￿ ows and unemployment moves out of the steady state.
Consider the transition from state 0 to state 1. The initial values of open and ￿lled
positions are de￿ned by equations 3 and 1 respectively, with w = w1 and ￿ = 0. Jobs
are destroyed at rate ￿H (d0) ￿job destruction rate ￿and new matches are formed at rate
￿0q (￿0)[1 ￿ H (a0)]u0=(1 ￿ u0) ￿job creation rate. Flows are in equilibrium and unemploy-
ment is constant at level u0. When an announcement or a political or economic shock takes
place, expectations moves from ￿0 = 0 to ￿1 > 0 and value functions change to:
rV = ￿k + q (￿)
Z xu
a
[J (s) ￿ V ]dH (s) + _ V (12)
rJ (x) = x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d [J (s) ￿ J (x)]dH (s) + ￿H (d)[V ￿ F ￿ J (x)]
+￿1 maxfV ￿ F ￿ J (x);J2 (x) ￿ J (x)g + _ J
(13)
where _ V and _ J are the expected variation in the valuation of V and J over time. Optimizing












d + (r + ￿ + ￿)F if J (d) > 0
d + (r + ￿)F + ￿ d2￿d
r+￿+￿ if J (d) < 0 (15)
d = w1 ￿ ￿
￿
1
r + ￿ + ￿
Z d2
d
(s ￿ d)dH (s) + [1 ￿ H (d2)]
d2 ￿ d








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ rF
These equations do not depend on the time derivatives _ V and _ J and are identical to the
equilibrium conditions for state 1 derived in Appendix A.17 This means that the key para-
meters, a, d and ￿, jump at the new steady state value as soon as the shock occurs and do
not move any more. The only sticky variable is unemployment, u, that adjusts according to
equation 11.
17It is easily showed that the optimizing conditions force the time derivatives _ V and _ J to be equal to zero.
See Pissarides (2000) for a discussion of the out of the steady state dynamics. Formal derivations are available
upon request.
12The dynamics of ￿ ows and unemployment are depicted in Figures 2 to 4. On impact,
the job destruction rate rises from ￿H (d0) to f￿H (d1)+ [H (d1) ￿ H (d0)]g. The variation
follows the increase in the job destruction threshold, d, and the separations of all matches
with productivity x in the range d0 ￿ x ￿ d1. Then job destruction drops to ￿H (d1)
till the next shock. The job creation rate decreases from ￿0q (￿0)[1 ￿ H (a0)]u0/(1 ￿ u0) to
￿1q (￿1)[1 ￿ H (a1)]u0/(1 ￿ u0); because of the higher a and the lower ￿. Then, as long as
unemployment increases, job creation rises until it matches the higher job destruction rate
at the new steady state.18
On impact unemployment also jumps, following the rise in the job destruction ￿ ows, but
does not reach the new steady state level in one step. As long as the job destruction rate
is higher than the job creation rate, the unemployment level increases and it adjusts slowly
to the new steady state level u1.19 This is a well known property of the matching model
(see Pissarides (2000)): frictions imply that unemployment is a predetermined variable and
follows a stable and backward looking process governed by the di⁄erence between the job
creation and the job destruction ￿ ows.
Once the minimum wage actually increases a second transition path starts, from u1 to
u2. The hiring standard and the job destruction thresholds jump to the new steady state
values a2 and d2, and market tightness falls to ￿2. Job ￿ ows follow the same transition path
discussed before and unemployment gradually rises.
The disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum wage is distributed over time: a ￿rst increase
occurs between the announcement and the actual change
￿uex￿ante = u1 ￿ u0 (17)
a second increase takes place following the actual variation in the minimum wage
￿uex￿post = u2 ￿ u1 (18)
4.3 Unexpected increase in the minimum wage
A minimum wage variation is unexpected if agents never assign a nonzero probability to
the event. When the minimum wage actually increases, this is a shock to the economy that
switch directly from state 0 to state 2.
18The dynamics of the job ￿nding rate ￿i.e. the ratio between the number of newly formed match and
unemployment, ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)] ￿ are depicted in Figure 4. The job ￿nding rate does not depend on u,
therefore it jumps down from ￿0q (￿0)[1 ￿ H (a0)] to ￿1q (￿1)[1 ￿ H (a1)] without any transition.
19The lenght of transitions depends on the primitive parameters of the model, in particular it depends
on the e¢ ciency of the matching function. It may happen that at the time the minimum wage is actually
increased the transition has not ￿nished yet, so that the steady state 1 is never reached. In order to simplify
the comparisons among states we assume that the steady state 1 is reached before the minimum wage variation
occurs. Conclusions would be qualitatively the same if we allowed for a more general case but it would be
di¢ cult to quantify the unemployment level at the time of the minimum wage change and the following
disemployment e⁄ect.
13Value functions and equilibrium conditions have been discussed in the previous sections.
In this case we do not observe state 1 ￿the state with positive expectations about a change
in the minimum wage ￿but we can use the results showed for state 0 and state 2. As in the
model with expectations, when the minimum wage increases the job destruction threshold
d and the hiring standard a increase, while market tightness ￿ decreases. Therefore steady
state unemployment increases.
The unemployment dynamics are represented by the dotted line in Figure 2. There is
only one transition, from state 0 to state 1. After the increase in the minimum wage, the
unemployment moves from u0 to u2. The transition path of job ￿ ows and unemployment
has been detailed in the previous section.
Note that, when the increase in the minimum wage is unexpected, the disemployment
e⁄ect takes place only after the actual variation.
￿u = u2 ￿ u0 (19)
4.4 Comparison
Both expected and unexpected increase in the minimum wage lead to a rise in the unemploy-
ment rate. as regards the overall disemployment e⁄ect, i.e. the increase in unemployment
occurred between state 0 and state 2, there is no di⁄erence among the expected and the
unexpected policy variation. The di⁄erence is in the dynamics.
When the rise in the minimum wage is expected, the disemployment e⁄ect is split between
the ex-ante e⁄ect ￿before the actual change ￿and the ex-post e⁄ect ￿after the actual change.
Instead, when the increase in the minimum wage is unexpected, the disemployment e⁄ect is
concentrated ex-post.
This distinction is not irrelevant when it comes to the empirical estimation of the mini-
mum wage impact. Empirical studies analyzed the ex-post e⁄ect. But we just showed that
when the minimum wage variation is expected the ex-post e⁄ect is only a part of the total
e⁄ect. Firms anticipate the policy and adjust their behavior in advance so that the ex-post
impact of the minimum wage will be smaller. Unemployment increases less ￿from u1 to




: ￿H (d2) ￿ ￿H (d1) < ￿H (d2) ￿ ￿H (d0) (20)
JC
u
: ￿1q (￿1)[1 ￿ H (a1)] ￿ ￿2q (￿2)[1 ￿ H (a2)] < ￿0q (￿0)[1 ￿ H (a0)]
￿￿2q (￿2)[1 ￿ H (a2)]
(21)
The goal of this paper is to provide an explanation for the controversial empirical ￿nd-
ings, therefore we focus on the ex-post e⁄ect. Note that expectations do not neutralize the
14disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum wage, but they reduce its magnitude. This may help
understanding the di¢ culties in supporting the disemployment e⁄ect with robust empirical
evidence. In order to obtain a null or even positive employment e⁄ect we would need to
include labor participation or search e⁄ort decisions, but this goes beyond our purposes.20
5 Empirical analysis
The model presented in Section 4 predicts that a certain increase in the minimum wage leads
to a higher (ex-post) disemployment e⁄ect when it is unexpected than when it is expected.
Testing the model requires the discrimination among expected and unexpected minimum
wage changes. In general it is not possible to observe individual expectations about policy
changes, but the recent story of Spain provide a useful identi￿cation strategy.
5.1 Institutional framework
The Spanish law provides the minimum wage to be adjusted every half a year, taking into
account the cost of living, the level of wages and incomes in the country, the evolution of
productivity, and the economic situation. But in practice the government sets the interoccu-
pational minimum wage only one a year by Royal Decree, following a period of consultation
with the most representative trade unions and employers￿associations. The new amount
becomes mandatory from the ￿rst of each following January.
The minimum wage legislation applies to workers from all occupations, trades and eco-
nomic sectors. Subminimum wages are speci￿ed for trainees ￿subminima cannot be less
than 70, 80 and 90% of the inter-profession minimum wage for the ￿rst, second and third
year of validity of the contract. Until 1997 the government ￿xed two minimum wages: one
for adult workers (+18 years old) and another for workers aged between 16 and 18. The
di⁄erence was eliminated in 1998.
This particular setting suggests that minimum wage changes can be foreseen. Further-
more, Spain enjoyed a considerable political stability after the death of Franco and the birth
of democracy. From 1977 to now, Spain had four prime ministers only: Adolfo SuÆrez,
centre-right coalition, Felipe GonzÆlez, PSOE, JosØ Mar￿a Aznar, People￿ s Party, and JosØ
Luis Rodr￿guez Zapatero, Socialist Party. Political stability may have facilitated the forma-
tion of clear expectations.
The prediction of minimum wage changes was trivial during the second Aznar￿ s mandate.
JosØ Mar￿a Aznar L￿pez served as the President of the Government of Spain from 1996
to 2004. In 1997 the government promoted a process of dialogue with trade unions and
20In this model we abstract from workers￿decision about optimal search e⁄ort. When the minimum wage
increases, the value of being employed increases and could induce workers to exert more e⁄ort in searching
for a job with positive e⁄ect on employment. On the other hand, higher minimum wage means also lower
vacancy posting that is detrimental to the search e⁄ort. The net e⁄ect is ambiguous and there is no consensus
on the empirical evidence.
Neumark and Wascher (1995) found a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of the minimum wage on young workers￿
search e⁄ort and used this evidence to explain the weak disemployment e⁄ect found in some studies. On the
other side, Flinn (2006) did not ￿nd signi￿cant support for the minimum wage to rise the contact rates.
15employers￿organizations for the preparation of labor market reforms. The concertation led
to three agreements: Interprofessional Agreement on Collective Bargaining, Interprofessional
Agreement on Employment Stability, and Interprofessional Agreement to Fill the Gaps in
Collective Bargaining.21 As regards the wage setting, unions accepted wage moderation in
exchange for a limitation in the use of temporary contracts. In the following period the
minimum wage rose by two per cent each year, according to the in￿ ation target. Taking into
account the real in￿ ation, this meant a slight but persistent decrease in the real minimum
wage.22
Instead the increase in the minimum wage in July 2004 was largely unexpected, in the
timing and in the magnitude.
On 14th March of 2004, three days after the terrorist attack, the Spanish socialist party
won the election and JosØ Luis Rodr￿guez Zapatero became the new premier. An important
point in the socialist agenda was the increase in the minimum wage up to 600 euros by the
end of the mandate. Soon after the election Zapatero announced a rise in the minimum wage
by 6.6%, mandatory from the beginning of July.
The Economist called Zapatero "the unexpected prime minister", speculating that his
success was related, at least partly, to the train bombs in Madrid. On the 11th March of
2004 three trains exploded in Atocha Station in Madrid. The explosions killed 191 people
and 1,500 were wounded. It has been the largest peacetime attacks in Spanish history.
Spain was involved in Iraq war as an U.S. ally and has been threatened reprisals by Bin
Laden in the October of 2003. Nevertheless, the conservative government pointed in the
direction of ETA ￿the Basque separatist group that seeks the independence of the Basque
country ￿as the author of the attack. This claim was not taken back despite many hints
in the direction of Al-Qaeda. By the afternoon of the 13th of March it was already quite
clear that the attack was executed by an Islamic terrorist group. Blaming ETA against the
facts turned out to be a serious mistake for the right wing. The government was accused of
manipulating information about the real authorship of the attacks to avoid the consequences
of public anger at a bombing motivated by its foreign policy. Zapatero himself repeatedly
accused the Popular Party of lying about those who were responsible for the attacks and
promised to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq, in case he was elected.
Before the bombing opinion polls had pointed to a win for the People￿ s Party (PP), but
in a few days the election result was reversed. In a recent paper Montalvo(2006) identi￿es
the e⁄ect of the terrorist attacks on the election result comparing the voting behavior of
the presential voters with respect to the absentee voters, i.e. the citizens abroad. The ￿rst
group voted on the 14th of March, knowing about the terrorist attacks. The latter group
was allowed to start voting from the 2nd of March, so that they could have voted before
the bombing. A di⁄erence in di⁄erence estimator is constructed using data on voting results
of Congressional elections from 1993 to 2004. The estimate shows that the terrorist attack
reduced the support for the PP by approximately 5 percentage point. Therefore, the election
of the socialist party was as unexpected as the event, the bombing, that contributed to its
21See Molina Romo (2003, 2004) for an analysis of the concertation process in Spain in the 90s.
22The lowering of the real minimum wage was not a new experience for Spain. Table 3 shows that also
before the Aznar government, despite the high increase in the nominal minimum wage, the real one was
most of the time decreasing or roughly stable, due to the great in￿ ation in the 80s. The novelty was the
concertation process and therefore the broad agreement and widespread knowledge of this plan.
16realization. It follows that the July-2004 rise in the minimum wage was also unexpected, as
opposed to the widely expected variation previously carried out by the conservatory party.23
The Spanish case provide us with two types of minimum wage changes: expected, pre-
bombing, and unexpected, July-2004. Now we can test the prediction of the model concerning
the in￿ uence of expectations on the disemployment e⁄ect.
5.2 Data
Data used in the empirical investigation comes from the Economically Active Population
Survey (EPA) 2000-2006.24 EPA is a rotating quarterly survey carried out by the Span-
ish National Statistical Institution. Its main goal is to reveal the characteristics of the
population living in the Spanish national territory.
The planned sample size consists of about 64,000 households with approximately 150,000
individuals aged sixteen or more. The survey￿ s rotation scheme implies that every new
rotation group stays in the survey for six consecutive quarters, so that we can follow the
employment story of individuals for one year and a half. The questionnaire is submitted to
a single household respondent who answers for all the persons living in the household. The
household respondent may change between successive interviews. This allows low attrition
rate but increases the measurement error, especially in retrospective questions.
The questionnaire is composed of several sections asking about educational attainment
and working status of each individual in the household. The reference period for most
questions is the week before the interview. The ￿rst quarter of each year also includes
retrospective questions about the working status of the individual one year earlier. There
are no information about earnings.
Table 3, lower panel, shows that labor market participation is relatively low in Spain:
over the 2000-2006 period only around 50 per cent of the Spanish labor force was employed,
and 7 per cent was unemployed. Yet, participation rate was increasing, from 0.53 in 2000
to 0.64 in 2006, driven from the higher participation of the youth whose employment rate
augmented from 34.5 to 42.2 per cent. Unemployment followed a decreasing trend and ￿ ows
into employment greatly increased, especially for the youth. On the other side employment
stability lowered and separations increased as well. Note that the share of temporary workers
is considerably high in Spain: almost 70 per cent of the youth and 30 per cent of the adults
are employed under temporary contracts.
23At the time of the election, the July-2004 rise in the minimum wage became expected. We assume that
the time passed between the election and the actual rise in the minimum wage, two months, is not long
enough to allow agents to pre-adjust to the policy. Empirically, this is not a matter of concern because data
are quarterly, and it is not possible to distinguish March 2004, the election, from July 2004, the minimum
wage variation.
24INE, Enquesta de Poblaci￿n Activa, Anonimizado de Flujos, 2000-2006.
175.3 Econometric issues
Two sets of equations are estimated. At ￿rst we analyze the e⁄ect of the minimum wage
variation on the probability of being employed. Then, following Portugal and Cardoso (2006),
we concentrate on ￿ ows in and out of employment, and we relate them to the change in the
minimum wage. Analyzing the dynamics of ￿ ows, instead of the evolution of the employment
or the unemployment stock, allows us to identify the exact source for employment changing
and to better appreciate the role of the minimum wage even when the net disemployment
e⁄ect is small.
Exploiting the structure of the survey we can match 5/6 of the individuals in any two
consecutive quarters and check whether they changed status or not. We only distinguish
between employment and non-employment. The reason is that we are primarily interested
in the e⁄ect of the minimum wage on the youth, for whom unemployment and nonpartici-
pation in the labor force are typically not distinct states. Our dependent variables are the
employment status and the ￿ ows out of and into employment, namely: (i) ye
it is equal to 1
if individual i is employed in quarter t, 0 otherwise; (ii) yout
it is equal to 1 if individual i is
employed in quarter t and non-employed in quarter t+1, and it is set at 0 if she is employed
both at t and t + 1; (iii) yin
it is equal to 1 if individual i is non-employed in quarter t and
employed in quarter t + 1, and it is set at 0 if she is non-employed both at t and t + 1.
We use the same econometric framework to model the probability of being employed and of
switching status, the probit model:
Pr(yit = 1) = ￿(W￿) (22)
where ￿(￿) is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.
Note that Pr(ye










corresponds to the job destruction rate to employment, ￿H (d), and to the
job ￿nding rate, ￿q (￿)[1 ￿ H (a)], respectively. Our model predicts that a rise in the mini-
mum wage have higher e⁄ect on employment (decrease), job destruction (increase) and job
creation (decrease) when it is unexpected than when expected.
The key variable is the variation ￿quarter to quarter ￿in the real minimum wage. The
in￿ uence of expectations on the disemployment e⁄ect is identi￿ed comparing the change
in ￿ ows and employment probability following unexpected and expected variation in the
minimum wage. As explained in Section 7.1, the increase in July 2004 was unexpected. It
is identi￿ed by the variable UMW which is equal to 6.7 in the third quarter of 2004,25 and
zero elsewhere. All the other variations occurred to the real minimum wage are considered
as expected, including those related to in￿ ation, EMW.
Table 2 shows that during Aznar￿ s mandate, the real minimum wage moved very little,
whereas it increased signi￿cantly when Zapatero came into power. We may expect the
marginal e⁄ect of an increase in the minimum wage to be di⁄erent in the two periods.
Therefore an alternative speci￿cation have also been estimated, comparing the e⁄ects of
UMW with a new variable, ZMW, that takes value zero except for the minimum wage rise in
25Zapatero increase the nominal minimum wage by 6.6 per cent. From quarter 2:04 and 3:04 in￿ ation
declined by 0.1, therefore the variation in the real minimum wage between 2:04 and 3:04 is 6.7.
18the ￿rst quarter of 2006. This means we are assuming that the small movements arranged
by the right wing or due uniquely to in￿ ation had no impact on employment nor ￿ ows.
Changes in the minimum wage do not a⁄ect all workers, but only those who are low-
earners. Following most of the literature we identify the treatment group with the young
because they are more likely to be a⁄ected by the minimum wage policy. The control group
is composed by the adult. A di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach is applied to estimate the
following regression:
Pr(y = 1) = ￿(￿0 + ￿1Y + ￿2Y ￿ UMW + ￿3Y ￿ EMW + T￿ + X￿ + ") (23)
where Y is a dummy equal to 1 when the individual is aged 16-24 and 0 if older;26 T
is a set of time dummies, one for each quarter; and X is the set of covariates, including
gender, education, and the region of residence. The coe¢ cient ￿2 captures the e⁄ect of the
unexpected (2004:3) increase in the minimum wage on the treated group, ￿3 measures the
e⁄ect of the expected changes. The di⁄erence between the two coe¢ cients gives a measure
of the di⁄erence in the impact of expected and unexpected changes in the minimum wage.
Let￿ s illustrate the result in a simple case with only two periods. Equation 23 reads:
Pr(y = 1) = ￿(￿0 + ￿1Y + ￿2Y ￿ UMW + ￿3Y ￿ EMW + ￿1U + ￿2E + X￿ + ") (24)
where U and E are two time dummies that take value 1, respectively, at the quarter
2004:3 ￿unexpected change in the minimum wage ￿and 2002:1 ￿expected change. Young
individuals have probability ￿0+￿1+￿2+￿1+X￿ of being employed (or switching status) in
period 2004:3, and probability ￿0+￿1+￿3+￿2+X￿ in period 2002:1. The di⁄erence in the
impact of unexpected and expected changes in the minimum wage is (￿2 + ￿1) ￿ (￿3 + ￿2),
for the youth. Similarly we can compute the di⁄erential for the adult as (￿0 + ￿1 + X￿) ￿
(￿0 + ￿2 + X￿) = ￿1 ￿ ￿2. Subtracting one di⁄erential from the other, we get
(￿2 + ￿1) ￿ (￿3 + ￿2) ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿2) = ￿2 ￿ ￿3 (25)
which is the di⁄erential in the e⁄ect of unexpected and expected changes in the minimum
wage on employment (or ￿ ows), net time trend. Our model predicts this di⁄erence to be
positive in absolute values.27
26We consider only workers aged up to 54 years. Older workers are not included in order to minimize the
contamination of results generated by early retirement decisions.
27Strictly speaking, the proposed approach is not a di⁄erence in di⁄erence. The ￿rst stage di⁄erence is not
among pre-treatment probability and post-treatment probability, but between two di⁄erent treatment. We
could consider this speci￿cation as a di⁄erence in di⁄erence in di⁄erence. The initial di⁄erence, omitted in
the text, is the usual ￿rst stage:
(￿0 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿1 + X￿) ￿ (￿0 + ￿1 + X￿) = ￿2 + ￿1
which is the impact of the unexpected change in the minimum wage for the youth, and:
(￿0 + ￿1 + X￿) ￿ (￿0 + X￿) = ￿1
which is the relative impact on the adult. Similarly, the impact of the expected change in the minimum wage
would be ￿3 + ￿2 for the young, and ￿2 for the adult.
The second stage would be the di⁄erence among the impact on the young and on the adult for the two
di⁄erent treatment: ￿2 + ￿1 ￿ ￿1 = ￿2 for the unexpected change and ￿3 + ￿2 ￿ ￿2 = ￿3 for the expected
change.
In the end, the third di⁄erence turns out to be ￿2 ￿ ￿3.
19The main concern in a di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach is the choice of proper treatment
and control groups.28 Unfortunately EPA survey does not provide data about earnings,
therefore we cannot precisely disentangle the low wage workers, instead we exploited the
information from the Wage Structure Survey. Table 4 reports the annual average earnings of
Spanish workers in 2002 computed by age, gender, and educational attainments. Young work-
ers receive signi￿cantly lower wages, 9,686.12 euros whereas the overall average is 19,802.45
euros. This supports the traditional comparison between young and adult individuals. But
the 2002 annual minimum wage was set at 6,190.80 euros and among the youth there are also
high or medium wage earners who are not a⁄ected by the minimum wage change. Female
workers always get lower wages than males, especially if they are young and low educated
(without studies or primary education). Therefore several speci￿cation have been estimated:
(i) the young versus the adults; (ii) young females versus adult females; (iii) young females
with low education versus adult females with low education.
The model has also implication for the timing of the treatment e⁄ect: an expected change
in the minimum wage a⁄ects employment both before and after the actual variation, but an
unexpected change in the minimum wage may have e⁄ect only after. While there is only on
impact e⁄ect on ￿ ows (see Figure 3 and 4). The dynamics is introduced in equation 23 for
the employment probability including pre and post e⁄ect:
Pr(ye = 1) = ￿
￿
￿0 + ￿1Y + ￿2Y ￿ UMW + ￿1Y ￿ UMW￿pre + ￿2Y ￿ UMW￿post
+￿3Y ￿ EMW + ￿3Y ￿ EMW￿pre + ￿4Y ￿ EMW￿post + T￿ + X￿ + "
￿
(26)
where Y ￿ UMW￿pre (Y ￿ EMW￿pre) accounts for the impact of the unexpected (expected)
change in the minimum wage in the period preceding the actual change, and Y ￿ UMW￿post
(Y ￿ EMW￿post) accounts for the impact in the following period.29 The recent empirical
literature (see Neumark and Wascher (2007)) stresses the importance of including lagged
e⁄ects of the minimum wage because it may take time to adjust to policy changes, we also
include anticipated e⁄ects. The question is in the setting of the length of dynamic e⁄ects.
It a short length is chosen, it may miss part of the story, if too long it may capture events
di⁄erent from the policy under consideration. Therefore equation 26 is estimated using
di⁄erent lengths, from 0 to 4 quarters.
The employment out￿ ows regressions are replicated also focusing on temporary or per-
manent workers separately. The Spanish labor market is characterized by the coexistence
28Note that the estimate of equation 23 does not su⁄er from inconsistency of standard errors because the
treatment, i.e. the minimum wage variation, is not serially correlated. See Bertrand, Du￿ o, and Mullainathan
(2004).
29In practice Y ￿ UMW￿pre (Y ￿ UMW￿post) is set at 6.7 when the status y refers to a young individual
in x quarters preceding (following) July 2004; Y ￿ ZMW￿pre (Y ￿ ZMW￿post) is equal to 5.4 in x quarters
preceding (following) January 2006. With regard to Y ￿EMW￿pre (Y ￿EMW￿post), we assume that only the
variation in the real minimum wage associated to the yearly updating can have pre and post e⁄ect, whereas
those due to in￿ ation may only have on impact e⁄ect. This hypothesis is sensible in an environment of low
in￿ ation. Furthermore we assume that, before July 2004, the expectede increase in the real minimum wage
was constant at 2 per cent minus the in￿ ation rate. Therefore the increase of 4.9 per cent in January 2005 is
lowered to 2.4 when associated to quarters preceding July 2004.
The estimated coe¢ cient associated to the pre (post) e⁄ects account for the average e⁄ect of the minimum
wage variation within the pre (post) period.
20of two types of employment contracts: ￿xed-term and open-ended contracts. The former
are associated with low employment protection, whereas the latter are strongly protected
by high separation costs and just-cause standard. An increase in the cost of labor is likely
to a⁄ect the two groups of workers in a di⁄erent way. Firms will rather adjust the work-
force dismissing temporary workers, instead of paying ￿ring costs to terminate a permanent
contract.
6 Empirical results
Main results are reported in Tables 5 to 9. Estimates for the full set of regressions are not
included here but available upon request.
6.1 Employment probability
Consider ￿rst employment probability. Our model predicts a decrease in employment at the
time of the minimum wage increase. Furthermore transitions are expected in the following
period and, if the policy is expected, in the preceding quarters .
Marginal e⁄ects of a one percent increase in the minimum wage on the average individual
are shown in Tables 5 and 6. The ￿rst column includes only the on impact e⁄ect of the
minimum wage, the dynamics are added in column (2) and (3).30 We control for time
e⁄ects, region, age, gender and education. As anticipated in the previous Section, two
speci￿cations are implemented ￿using EMW or ZMW as expected-minimum-wage variable
￿for di⁄erent treatment and control groups. Note that the common variables are robust
across speci￿cations.
The upper panel compares young versus adult individuals. Surprisingly the on impact
e⁄ect of the unexpected change in the minimum wage is signi￿cantly positive: a 1 per cent
rise in UMW is estimated to increase employment probability by 0.3 per cent. Only the
post e⁄ect is negative. Its magnitude decreases as the length of the dynamics increase31,
suggesting that transitions are relatively short. The pre e⁄ect is statistically null. This
con￿rms the unexpected nature of UMW. The estimates associated to the expected change
in the minimum wage depend on the speci￿cation. When we consider all the expected
variations occurred before and after Zapatero election, EMW, both the on impact and pre
e⁄ects are null. Let￿ s recall that the minimum wage was increased very mildly during the
Aznar￿ s mandate. If employment reacts only to substantial variation in the minimum wage,
as argued by Card and Krueger (1995), this non linearity is not accounted in the econometric
model and may bias the result. Furthermore the wage moderation policy carried on by Aznar
dates back to the agreements in 1997 and its e⁄ect may have been fully anticipated by 2000.
Therefore we focus on the second speci￿cations, UMW versus ZMW. In this case, only
the January 2006 variation is considered as expected. The on impact and pre e⁄ects are
signi￿cantly negative, as predicted by the model.
30Tables 5 and 6 shows estimates for the dynamic e⁄ect of the minimum wage two quarters before and
after the actual change. Results for di⁄erent transition lenghts are detailed in Appendix B1, available upon
request.
31These results are not reported here, but available upon request.
21The second panel restricts the sample to females. Results are similar in magnitude,
but only the post e⁄ect of UMW is statistically signi￿cant. In the lower panel, we compare
young females with low education with adult females with low education. The coe¢ cients
associated to the expected variation ZMW are negative and signi￿cant both on impact and
in the dynamics ￿ but the pre e⁄ect is only marginally signi￿cant ￿ in line with model
predictions. The unexpected change reduces employment only ex-post.
How do we explain the positive or not signi￿cant e⁄ect of the unexpected increase in the
minimum wage? Part of the story may lie on the surprise: Zapatero was unexpectedly elected
in March 2004 and after 3 moths the minimum wage was substantially raised. Economic
agents need time to weight the importance of a shock and to react, so that the negative
e⁄ect is found only ex-post. But other forces may play a role: the change of power from the
right wing to the left and the subsequent rise in the minimum wage could have increased
the workers￿con￿dence in the labor market, enhancing participation and active job search.
This is con￿rmed by the jump in participation rates, especially of young people.
6.2 Flows out of employment
Regressions in Tables 7 and 8 compare the ￿ ows out of employment following expected
and unexpected changes in the minimum wage, for the treatment and the control group.
All speci￿cations control for time e⁄ects, region, age, gender, education, contract type,
working day, sector, occupation, whether the individual was employed in the public sector
and whether she attended any courses during the last month. Estimates of the marginal
e⁄ects for the full sample of workers are reported in column (All).
The upper panel shows results for young versus adult persons. In both speci￿cations
the estimated on impact e⁄ect of the unexpected increase in the minimum wage is signi￿-
cantly positive and higher than the corresponding e⁄ect of the expected change, which is not
statistically di⁄erent from zero. A 1 per cent unexpected increase in the minimum wage is
associated to an increase in job separation probability by 0.2 per cent, while the e⁄ect is null
after an expected minimum wage rise. These results are consistent with model predictions:
expectations reduce the e⁄ect of the minimum wage at the time of the actual variation.
Regressions in the second panel compare young females with adult females. Previous
results are con￿rmed: UMW has greater e⁄ect than EMW and ZMW. The same is true in
the third panel, which considers only females with low education. Note that the e⁄ect of the
minimum wage, both expected and unexpected, increases as we restrict the sample. This
support the idea that we better identi￿ed the treatment group in the lower panels. On the
other side, the size of the sample substantially shrinks.
The other columns of Tables 7 and 8 report estimates associated to temporary and perma-
nent workers. The second column considers ￿ ows from temporary jobs to non-employment.
An increase in UMW implies a signi￿cant rise in the job separation probability. Coe¢ cients
associated to expected changes in the minimum wage are smaller and not signi￿cant. Per-
manent workers, third column, are not a⁄ected by the minimum wage, all the coe¢ cients
are statistically null. Results are somewhat di⁄erent if we consider the subsample of low
educated females in the third panel. Permanent workers are signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the
22unexpected policy, but the coe¢ cient associated to temporary workers is higher, albeit only
marginally signi￿cant. Still, the e⁄ect of EMW and ZMW is lower and not signi￿cant.
Note that the di⁄erence in the coe¢ cients of UMW between the two types of worker cannot
be entirely traced back to the role of ￿ring costs. On one side, employment protection may
prevent permanent workers to be dismissed by increasing the adjustment cost with respect to
temporary workers.32 On the other side, the productivity distribution do matters: temporary
jobs may be, on average, less productive and a higher share fall under the job destruction
threshold when the minimum wage increases.33 Anyway, we are interested in the di⁄erence
between the impact of expected and unexpected change in the minimum wage within the
same group of workers. As regards temporary workers, we ￿nd support for the higher e⁄ect
of unexpected policy with respect to expected variations.
All regressions take into account several control variables. Time and regional dummies
are mostly signi￿cant. Young workers are more likely to separate, their probability to exit
employment is 1 to 2 per cent higher than adults. Being female increases this probability by
another 2 per cent. The characteristics of the employment relationship also matters: part
time workers are associated to higher mobility ￿except if we restrict our attention to the
subsample of female with low education ￿and, not surprisingly, temporary contracts entail
greater separation rates. On the other side, education faintly reduces job exit. Both positive
and negative e⁄ects are somewhat stronger for temporary workers, and weaker for permanent
ones.
6.3 Flows into employment
According to the model, higher labor cost should lead to lower ￿ ows into employment,
but estimates in Table 9 are largely not signi￿cant and positive for both expected and
unexpected changes in the minimum wage. The increase in the minimum wage had either
no e⁄ects on employment in￿ ows, either a positive e⁄ect. In Section 6.1, we found a positive
or not signi￿cant employment e⁄ect of the minimum wage, on impact. Now we are able
to characterize it: when the minimum wage augments job destruction increases but it is
counterbalanced by the rise in job creation.
Not surprisingly, the young have greater probability to enter a job. Females are associated
to in￿ ows smaller by 6.6 per cent. They appear to be discriminated both in entering and
exiting the labor market, but the lower participation rate and unobservable characteristics
may contribute in explaining these results. Adopting and active method of search ￿such
as inquiring the job centre, or private employment agencies, contacting directly employers,
etc. ￿helps ￿nding a job. Education has a positive e⁄ect. In particular, having a university
degree augments the probability to enter a job by 7% (8.3% in the subsample of females).
The region of residence and the period a⁄ect the outcome.
32The counterbalancing e⁄ect of EPL on the disemployment impact of the minimum wage is claimed also
by Neumark and Wascher (2004). Using a panel of several countries, they estimate the disemployment e⁄ect
of the minimum wage to depend, negatively, on the degree of employment protection.
33When ￿nding an occupation is easier in the market of temporary jobs, lower skill workers are likely to
self-select themselves into this market, whereas permanent jobs will be ￿lled by higher skill workers.
236.4 Discussing the results
We claim the disemployment e⁄ect of the minimum wage to be di⁄erent depending on
whether it was expected or not. Our results partly con￿rm this idea: the rise in job sepa-
rations is estimated to be stronger in case of an unexpected changes in the minimum wage,
with respect to expected variations. The di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant and not negli-
gible: a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is associated to an augment in the job-exit
probability by 2% (4% if only females are taken into account) if unexpected versus not sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ect if expected. On the other side, job creation rates do not appear to be a⁄ected
by changes in the minimum wage.34 The model presented in Section 2 predicts a loss in job
creation, but it has to be stressed that our model abstracts from the workers￿behavior. A
matching model including the workers￿decision about the optimal search e⁄ort would be able
to reproduce these results. The rise in the minimum wage may induce agents to exert more
e⁄ort in looking for a better paid job, thus increasing the e¢ ciency of the match process and
counterbalancing the lower vacancy posting. The evolution of the participation rate goes in
this direction: the youth￿ s participation rate was, on average, 47.5 per cent in 2000-2003, it
jumped to 49.2 in 2004, and 52.1 in 2005. Higher participation has the same e⁄ect on ￿ ows
than greater search e⁄ort and may account for the lack of response in job creation rates.
Depending on the sample used, we estimate a positive or null disemployment on-impact
e⁄ect of the unexpected increase in the minimum wage. The analysis of ￿ ows allows us to
trace back this result to the increase in job in￿ ows compensating the higher job separations.
Empirical evidence suggests that young individuals reacted to Zapatero election and the rise
in the minimum wage by participating more and more e⁄ectively in the labor market. But
over a longer period the negative e⁄ect prevailed and employment was reduced, resulting in
a negative ex-post e⁄ect. On the other side, small expected changes in the minimum wage,
as during the Aznar mandate, had no signi￿cant e⁄ect on employment. The substantial
expected increase occurred in January 2006 is estimated to have negative, albeit not always
signi￿cant, on impact and dynamic e⁄ects.
The e⁄ect of the minimum wage is found to be di⁄erent depending on the employment
relationship: temporary workers are highly a⁄ected, especially by unexpected variations. On
the contrary there is no evidence of increased job separations for permanent workers. This
may be due to the protection guaranteed by ￿ring costs ￿whenever a labor force adjustment
is needed, a ￿rm will rather cheaply dismiss temporary workers ￿or to di⁄erences among
the two types of workers ￿if temporary ones are, on average, less productive, a higher share
will be a⁄ected by the minimum wage.
34These ￿ndings are at odds with Portugal and Cardoso (2006). Their results point out a negative e⁄ect of
the minimum wage on hirings, and a decrease in job separations for young workers explained by higher job
attachment. Instead, we ￿nd no e⁄ect on hirings and an increase in separations. Nevertheless, the discrepacy
is not crucial because of the di⁄erent focus of their analysis. Portugal and Cardoso study the impact of the
increase in the sub-minimum wage for workers aged 17-19 years, in Portugal, and compare those individuals
with a control group composed by persons aged 20-35 years. Whereas in our study the treated are aged 16-24
years and controls are 25-54 years old. It should not be surprising that comparing teenagers with young
individuals gives di⁄erent results from the comparison between the young and the adults.
247 Conclusion
Empirical literature on minimum wages is characterized by controversial results. It is far from
clear whether a policy that increase the minimum wage has a negative e⁄ect on employment
or not. Nor economic theory provides a clear prediction.
This paper contributes to the debate by proposing a mechanism capable of reconciling
con￿ icting ￿ndings. The key ingredient is the distinction between expected and unexpected
changes in the minimum wage. The role of expectations in shaping the behavior of economic
agents has been extensively studied in a variety of subject, but not in the analysis of the
minimum wage e⁄ect. In many countries law determines the level of the minimum wage
and the periodicity of its revision. Sometimes it also ￿xes criteria to be used to update the
minimum wage, such as the dynamics of prices and productivity. In light of these features,
it is important to understand how expectations about the future change in the minimum
wage a⁄ect the employment impact of this policy.
The model proposed include expectations and shows that, when the change in the mini-
mum wage is expected, the disemployment e⁄ect is going to be smaller than in the case of an
unexpected change of the same magnitude. The reason is that the e⁄ect of the higher future
labor cost has been partly anticipated by agents. This does not mean that expected changes
are less detrimental to the labor market, but that it is more di¢ cult to empirically measure
their e⁄ect because they also impact on the current agents￿behavior. Thus, in order to test
whether minimum wage a⁄ect or not unemployment, it would be safer to limit the analysis
to the unexpected minimum wage changes.
A clear case of unexpected variation in the minimum wage is the increase operated in
Spain, in July 2004, by the newly-elected socialist party. We use this natural experiment to
test the validity of our model. In particular we compare the estimated e⁄ect of that rise in
the minimum wage on employment and on workers￿￿ ow with the e⁄ect of expected changes.
In order to net out confounding factors, we implement a di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach
along several speci￿cations: the young versus the adults, young females versus adult females,
young females with low education versus adult females with low education.
Our results show that the unexpected increase in the minimum wage leads to a stronger
rise in job separation than expected variations. The impact is greater if we restrict the
analysis to temporary workers, while permanent workers do not seem to be a⁄ected by the
minimum wage policy. With regard to job creation, we estimate null e⁄ects of the minimum
wage regardless of expectations, whereas our model predicts a fall in employment in￿ ows.
These ￿ndings may be explained by supply-side factors, as labor market participation deci-
sion and search e⁄ort. Data show that the participation rate raised in 2004 and 2005, when
the minimum wage was substantially increased.
The net employment e⁄ect depends on the magnitude of ￿ ows. On impact, the surprise
of Zapatero election highly enhanced participation and, in turn, job in￿ ows, balancing the
increase in separations. When we consider the e⁄ect of the unexpected policy over a longer
period, the estimates support a sizable disemployment e⁄ect. A 10 per cent unexpected
increase in the minimum wage reduces young employment by 2 per cent in the following
two or three quarters, by 4 per cent if we restrict to females. On the contrary, the expected
variations have some negative on-impact e⁄ect on employment, but no signi￿cant e⁄ect ex-
post.
25In sum, employment stock and ￿ ows are found to react in a di⁄erent way to minimum
wage changes depending on expectations. A low ex-post response of job separations and
employment may be traced back to the adjustment in the behavior of economic agents
occurred before the actual change. It follows that the ex-post e⁄ect may be too small to
be identi￿ed in the data. Therefore expectations can explain, at least party, the empirical


















J1(x) is the value of a job with productivity x in state 1 (wage w=w1; expectations φ= φ1) 
J2(x) is the value of a job with productivity x in state 2 (wage w=w2; expectations φ= φ2=0) 
a is the productivity level such that J(x) is null; it is called hiring standard. 
d is the productivity level such that J(x) is equal to –F, the firing cost; it is called job destruction 
threshold. 
The position of J1(x) depends on the value of the primitive parameters. Here, two cases are 
depicted: A and B. When firing costs are low with respect to the minimum wage variation, case A, 
the hiring standard a1 is lower than the job destruction threshold in state 2, d2. Otherwise, case B, 


































The continuous line represents the dynamics of unemployment along state 0, state 1 and state 2 in 
case of an expected change in the minimum wage. 
The discontinuous line depict the dynamics of unemployment along state 0 and state 2 in case of 
an unexpected increase in the minimum wage. 
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The continuous line represents the dynamics of the JD (JC) rate along state 0, state 1 and state 2 in 
case of an expected change in the minimum wage. 
The discontinuous line depict the dynamics of the JD (JC) rate along state 0 and state 2 in case of 
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The continuous line represents the dynamics of the job finding rate along state 0, state 1 and state 
2 in case of an expected change in the minimum wage. 
The discontinuous line depict the dynamics of the job finding rate along state 0 and state 2 in case 
of an unexpected increase in the minimum wage. 
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Table 1. The minimum wage policy in OECD countries. 




































At least yearly 
Usually every 12 months 
Twice a year 
Every two years 
When necessary 
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Table 2. Evolution of the minimum wage in Spain 
Date of coming 
into effect  Minimum wage  Variation over 
previous MW  CPI 
1  Variation real 
MW 
6-1-1980 136.85  10.2  15.56  -5.36 
6-1-1981 153.98  12.5  14.54  -2.04 
1-1-1982 170.93  11.0  14.41  -3.41 
1-1-1983 193.29  13.1  12.17  0.93 
1-1-1984 208.79  8.0 11.28  -3.28 
1-1-1985 223.40  7.0  8.81  -1.81 
1-1-1986 241.25  8.0  8.79  -0.79 
1-1-1987 253.33  5.0  6.10  -1.1 
1-1-1988 264.69  4.5  4.41  0.09 
1-1-1989 280.55  6.0  6.22  -0.22 
1-1-1990 300.57  7.1  6.99  0.11 
1-1-1991 320.04  6.5  6.18  0.32 
1-1-1992 338.25  5.7  6.55  -0.85 
1-1-1993 351.77  4.0  4.23  -0.23 
1-1-1994 364.03  3.5  5.00  -1.5 
1-1-1995 376.83  3.5  4.77  -1.27 
1-1-1996 390.18  3.5  3.65  -0.15 
1-1-1997 400.45  2.6  2.54  0.06 
1-1-1998 408.93  2.1  1.85  0.25 
1-1-1999 416.32  1.8  1.87  -0.07 
1-1-2000 424.80  2.0  2.92  -0.92 
1-1-2001 433.45  2.0  3.79  -1.79 
1-1-2002 442.20  2.0  2.50  -0.5 
1-1-2003 451.20  2.0  3.75  -1.75 
1-1-2004 460.50  2.0  2.19  -0.19 
7-1-2004 490.80  6.6  2.20  4.4 
1-1-2005 513.00  4.5  1.04  3.46 
1-1-2006 540.90  5.4  4.01  1.39 
1-1-2007 570.60  5.5  2.42  3.08 
 
Source: Minimum wage: Ministerio Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (BOE); CPI: OECD (MEI). 
1 Values in CPI column shows the percentage change of the CPI between two changes in the minimum wage, so 
that CPI=6.10 in 1/1/1987 is the variation of the price level between 1/1/1986 and 1/1/1987; and CPI=2.20 in 




Table 3. Composition of the dataset, percentage. 
 2000-2006  2000  2004  2006 
A g e :       
     young (16-24)  13.99  15.82  13.15  12.68 
     adult (25-54)  53.94  52.52  54.25  55.29 
     old (at least 55)  32.06  31.67  32.60  32.03 
Gender:      
     male  48.68  48.55  48.55  49.00 
     female  51.32  51.45  51.45  51.00 
Education:      
     primary or lower  37.96  42.89  36.95  32.90 
     secondary or professional  41.99  39.23  42.61  44.76 
     university or higher  20.05  17.88  20.44  22.34 
S t a t u s :       
     employed  50.37  45.68  49.43  58.15 
          Contract type:
 1      
               temporary  32.00  32.08  30.64  34.03 
               permanent  68.00  67.92  69.36  65.97 
          Sector:
 1      
               primary  5.23  6.02  4.99  4.49 
               manufacturing  30.70  31.56  30.38  29.58 
               services  63.91  62.42  64.63  65.48 
          Occupation:
 1      
armed  forces  0.52 0.54 0.52 0.45 
legislators, senior officials 
and managers 
7.53 7.90 7.64 7.28 
professionals  12.47 11.80 13.22 12.28 
technicians and associate 
professionals 
10.74 9.75 10.94  11.45 
clerk  9.48 9.92 9.28 9.28 
service workers and shop 
and market sales workers 
14.35 13.66 14.24 15.39 
skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers  
3.30 4.07 3.22 2.58 
craft and related trade 
workers 
17.22 17.43 16.99 16.70 
plant and machine operators 
and assemblers 
9.95 10.71 9.96  9.26 
elementary  occupations 14.31 14.20 14.00 14.89 
          Public  15.93  16.23  16.67  14.71  
34 
 
          Private  83.92  83.77  83.33  84.84 
     unemployed  6.98  7.66  7.24  5.79 
          long term unemployed 
2  31.59 33.67 31.28 29.22 
     out of labor force  42.65  46.66  43.33  36.06 
 Young  Adult 
  2000 2006 2000 2006 
Education:      
     primary or lower  9.88  10.53  28.83  15.58 
     secondary or professional  74.75  76.09  45.61  52.93 
     university or higher  15.37  13.39  25.56  31.48 
S t a t u s :       
     employed  34.52  42.20  70.77  75.44 
          Contract type:
 1      
               temporary  68.44  66.08  27.62  31.55 
               permanent  31.56  33.92  72.38  68.45 
     unemployed  12.77  9.97  10.31  6.57 
     out of labor force  52.71  47.83  18.92  17.99 
Flows:
 3      
     employment-employment  88.62  84.03  96.05  94.90 
     employment-non employment  11.38  15.96  3.95  5.10 
     unemployment-unemployment  62.30  35.25  69.27  41.15 
     unemployment-employment  26.12  42.00  20.62  35.93 
     unemployment-out of labor force  11.58  22.75  10.11  22.92 
     nonemployment-nonemployment  91.72  84.59  91.68  84.90 
     nonemployment-permanent job  0.75  1.40  1.47  2.78 
     nonemployment-temporary job  7.54  14.01  6.85  12.32 
 
Source: Computation based on INE, Enquesta de Población Activa, Anonimizado de Flujos, 2000-2006. 
Values are computed as (weighted) percentages over the number of individuals who answered the relative 
questions. 
1 Percentages computed over the employed persons. 
2 Percentages computed over the unemployed persons. 
3 Percentages refers to the share of employed (unemployed) individuals who got employed (unemployed) 






Table 4. Annual average earnings per worker. 
 Both  sexes  Males  Females 
All  ages:     
All  studies  19,802.45 22,169.16 15,767.56 
Without studies  12,903.30  14,834.33  8,472.45 
Primary  education  15,640.44 17,645.14 10,826.92 
Secondary education I  15,679.54  17,591.76  11,700.95 
Secondary education II  21,634.00  25,324.39  16,483.21 
Intermediate vocational training  17,961.83 21,273.29 14,376.30 
Advanced level vocational training  20,990.63  23,521.88  16,133.26 
University diploma or equivalent  25,760.28  30,757.84  21,151.78 
University graduates, advanced engineers and doctors  32,997.45  38,691.15  25,629.76 
16-20:     
All studies  9,686.12  10,544.80  7,969.87 
Without studies  9,278.73  10,512.64  5,541.15 
Primary education  10,298.77  11,239.23  7,764.66 
Secondary education I  9,628.97  10,328.17  8,241.05 
Secondary education II  8,033.05  8,578.59  7,568.66 
Intermediate vocational training 9,466.13  10,479.07  7,967.70 
Advanced level vocational training  9,972.65  10,514.21  8,220.05 
University diploma or equivalent  .  .  . 
University graduates, advanced engineers and doctors  .  .  . 
20-29:     
All  studies  14,362.39 15,514.60 12,807.39 
Without studies  10,829.08  11,885.03  7,867.49 
Primary education  12,514.78  13,699.42  9,831.87 
Secondary education I  12,719.82  13,926.53  10,632.19 
Secondary education II  13,567.01  15,380.88  11,917.10 
Intermediate vocational training  13,593.23 15,542.71 11,469.79 
Advanced level vocational training  15,035.08  16,564.92  12,814.17 
University diploma or equivalent  17,745.12  19,991.45  16,145.80 
University graduates, advanced engineers and doctors  19,954.96  21,779.35  18,431.84 
30-39:     
All  studies  19,617.60 21,403.46 16,691.07 
Without studies  12,521.57  14,279.82  8,213.71 
Primary  education  14,220.82 15,856.50 10,191.84 
Secondary education I  15,093.27  16,763.60  11,486.21 
Secondary education II  20,289.74  22,938.64  16,842.99 
Intermediate vocational training  17,458.46 20,358.07 14,219.56  
36 
 
Advanced level vocational training  20,911.57  22,946.39  17,150.76 
University diploma or equivalent  25,120.61  28,897.29  21,407.02 
University graduates, advanced engineers and doctors  31,319.03  35,695.59  26,236.48 
40-49:     
All  studies  22,995.37 25,856.57 17,962.67 
Without studies  13,574.95  15,989.38  8,849.69 
Primary  education  16,376.78 18,755.03 11,558.79 
Secondary education I  17,873.95  20,207.01  13,032.38 
Secondary education II  27,445.69  30,790.41  21,373.92 
Intermediate vocational training  21,611.09 26,449.83 16,750.49 
Advanced level vocational training  26,196.57  28,724.20  20,256.25 
University diploma or equivalent  31,161.56  37,751.95  25,280.99 
University graduates, advanced engineers and doctors  42,183.66  47,529.07  33,117.10 
 














Table 5. Employment (UMW vs. EMW), Probit regression model. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult     
young*UMW
1  0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***
young*EMW
2  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)  (0.001) 
young*UMW_pre
3     -0.000 
     (0.001) 
young*UMW_post
4   -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)***
young*EMW_pre
3     0.000 
     (0.001) 
young*EMW_post
4   0.001  0.001 
   (0.001)**  (0.001)* 
Pseudo-R
2  0.237 0.237 0.237 
Observations  1889412 1889412 1889412 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female    
young*UMW
1  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)*  (0.001)* 
young*EMW
2  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.001) 
young*UMW_pre
3     -0.001 
     (0.001) 
young*UMW_post
4   -0.003  -0.003 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)***
young*EMW_pre
3     -0.000 
     (0.001) 
young*EMW_post
4   0.001  0.001 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Pseudo-R2  0.147 0.147 0.147 
Observations  952728 952728 952728 
TREATED: Young female low education 
CONTROL: Adult female low education 
 
young*UMW
1  0.001 0.003 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
young*EMW
2  -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
young*UMW_pre
3     -0.002 
     (0.002) 
young*UMW_post
4   -0.010  -0.011 




3     0.002 
     (0.003) 
young*EMW_post
4   -0.012  -0.013 
   (0.003)***  (0.003)***
Pseudo-R2  0.033 0.033 0.033 
Observations  199349 199349 199349 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Reading: 
The estimates are for employment probability, for individuals aged 16-54. The table reports marginal effects 
computed at the sample means of continuous variables (and at value zero of the variables involving the minimum 
wage variation); and discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. The values associated to young*UMW (_pre 
and _post), young*EMW (_pre and _post), young*ZMW (_pre and _post) are the marginal effects of an increase by 
1% of the minimum wage. 
All models control for age (dummy equal to 1 if age 16-24, 0 if age 24-54), gender, education, whether the 
individual attended any courses during the last month, time (quarterly) effect, linear trend, region of residence (18 
dummies). 
1interaction among young, a dummy equal to 1 in quarter 2004:3, and the minimum wage variation. 
2interaction among young, a dummy equal to 1 in every other quarter than 2004:3, and the minimum wage 
variation. 
3effect of the variation in the minimum wage on the former 2 quarters. 
4effect of the variation in the minimum wage on the following 2 quarters. 
 
 
Table 6. Employment (UMW vs. ZMW), Probit regression model. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult     
young*UMW
1  0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***
young*ZMW
2  -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)***
young*UMW_pre
3     -0.001 
     (0.001) 
young*UMW_post
4   -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)***
young*ZMW_pre
3     -0.002 
     (0.001)** 
young*ZMW_post
4   0.000  -0.000 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Pseudo-R
2  0.237 0.237 0.237 
Observations  1889412 1889412 1889412  
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TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female    
young*UMW
1  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)*  (0.001) 
young*ZMW
2  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
young*UMW_pre
3     -0.001 
     (0.001) 
young*UMW_post
4   -0.003  -0.004 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)***
young*ZMW_pre
3     -0.001 
     (0.001) 
young*ZMW_post
4   -0.001  -0.001 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Pseudo-R2  0.147 0.147 0.147 
Observations  952728 952728 952728 
TREATED: Young female low education 
CONTROL: Adult female low education 
 
young*UMW
1 0.001  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
young*ZMW
2  -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.005)*  (0.005)**  (0.005)** 
young*UMW_pre
3     -0.003 
     (0.002) 
young*UMW_post
4   -0.009  -0.010 
   (0.003)***  (0.003)***
young*ZMW_pre
3     -0.006 
     (0.004)* 
young*ZMW_post
4   -0.009  -0.010 
   (0.004)***  (0.004)***
Pseudo-R2  0.033 0.033 0.033 
Observations  199349 199349 199349 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 




Table 7. Flows out of employment (UMW vs. EMW), Probit regression model. 
 All  Temporary  Permanent 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult     
young*UMW
1 0.002  0.008  0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)***  (0.000) 
young*EMW
2 0.000  0.001  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
young 0.019  0.041  0.014 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001)***
female 0.020  0.045  0.010 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)***  (0.000)***
temporary 0.085  -  - 
 (0.001)***    
part-time 0.013  0.022  0.012 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001)***
Pseudo-R
2 0.161  0.056  0.064 
Observations 956432  321085  635347 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female    
young*UMW
1 0.004  0.009  0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001) 
young*EMW
2 0.000  0.002  -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001)* (0.000) 
young 0.018  0.036  0.012 
 (0.001)*** (0.003)***  (0.001)***
temporary 0.106  -  - 
 (0.001)***    
part-time 0.011  0.016  0.011 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001)***
Pseudo-R2 0.156  0.057  0.070 
Observations 396856  143465  253391 
TREATED: Young female low education 
CONTROL: Adult female low education 
 
young*UMW
1 0.008  0.011  0.008 
  (0.003)** (0.007) (0.003)** 
young*EMW
2 0.004  0.005  0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
young 0.008  0.004  0.021 
 (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.008)***
temporary 0.145  -  - 
 (0.003)***    
part-time -0.001  -0.027  0.015 
 (0.003)  (0.007)***  (0.003)*** 
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Pseudo-R2 0.162  0.090  0.050 
Observations 48789  19384  29405 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Reading: 
The estimates are for employment probability, for individuals aged 16-54. The table reports marginal effects 
computed at the sample means of continuous variables (and at value zero of the variables involving the minimum 
wage variation); and discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. The values associated to young*UMW (_pre 
and _post), young*EMW (_pre and _post), young*ZMW (_pre and _post) are the marginal effects of an increase by 
1% of the minimum wage. 
All models control for age (dummy equal to 1 if age 16-24, 0 if age 24-54), gender, education, contract type, 
working day lenght, time (quarterly) effect, linear trend, region (18 dummies), sector (3 dummies), occupation 
(10 dummies), whether the individual was employed in the public sector and whether she attended any courses 
during the last month. All the independent variables refer to the initial situation, before the exit from the 
employment pool. 
1interaction among young, a dummy equal to 1 in quarter 2004:3, and the minimum wage variation. 
2interaction among young, a dummy equal to 1 in every other quarter than 2004:3, and the minimum wage 
variation. 
3effect of the variation in the minimum wage on the former 2 quarters. 





Table 8. Flows out of employment (UMW vs. ZMW), Probit regression model. 
 All  Temporary  Permanent 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult     
young*UMW
1 0.002  0.008  0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)***  (0.000) 
young*ZMW
2 0.001  0.002  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
young 0.018  0.040  0.014 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001)***
female 0.020  0.045  0.010 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)***  (0.000)***
temporary 0.085  -  - 
 (0.001)***    
part-time 0.013  0.022  0.012 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001)***
Pseudo-R
2 0.161  0.056  0.064 
Observations 956432  321085  635347  
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TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female    
young*UMW
1 0.004  0.009  0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001) 
young*ZMW
2 0.001  0.001  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
young 0.017  0.035  0.012 
 (0.001)*** (0.003)***  (0.001)***
temporary 0.106  -  - 
 (0.001)***    
part-time 0.011  0.016  0.011 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.001)***
Pseudo-R2 0.156  0.056  0.070 
Observations 396856  143465  253391 
TREATED: Young female low education 
CONTROL: Adult female low education 
 
young*UMW
1 0.008  0.011  0.008 
 (0.003)*** (0.007)*  (0.003)** 
young*ZMW
2 0.008  0.017  0.005 
 (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.006) 
young 0.006  0.000  0.020 
 (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.008)** 
temporary 0.145  -  - 
 (0.003)***    
part-time -0.001  -0.027  0.015 
 (0.003)  (0.007)***  (0.003)***
Pseudo-R2 0.162  0.090  0.049 
Observations 48789  19384  29405 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 




Table 9. Flows into employment, Probit regression model. 
 U MW vs. EMW UMW vs. ZMW 
TREATED: Young - CONTROL: Adult    
young*UMW
1 0.001  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
young*EMW
2 0.001  0.004 
 (0.001)  (0.003)* 
young 0.041  0.040 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
female -0.066  -0.066 
 (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
active search  0.021  0.021 
 (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
Pseudo-R
2 0.104  0.104 
Observations 186191  186191 
TREATED: Young female - CONTROL: Adult female   
young*UMW
1 0.001  0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
young*EMW
2 0.001  0.005 
 (0.001)  (0.003) 
young 0.048  0.047 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
active search  0.021  0.021 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.110  0.110 
Observations 112978  112978 
TREATED: Young female low education 
CONTROL: Adult female low education 
young*UMW
1 0.009  0.009 
 (0.005)*  (0.005)* 
young*EMW
2 -0.001  0.012 
 (0.004)  (0.008) 
young 0.036  0.034 
 (0.009)***  (0.009)*** 
active search  0.016  0.016 
 (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.107  0.107 
Observations 21081  21081 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 




The estimates are for employment probability, for individuals aged 16-54. The table reports marginal effects 
computed at the sample means of continuous variables (and at value zero of the variables involving the minimum 
wage variation); and discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. The values associated to young*UMW (_pre 
and _post), young*EMW (_pre and _post), young*ZMW (_pre and _post) are the marginal effects of an increase by 
1% of the minimum wage. 
All models control for age (dummy equal to 1 if age 16-24, 0 if age 24-54), gender, education, contract type, 
working day lenght, time (quarterly) effect, linear trend, region (18 dummies), whether the individual is looking 
for the first job or last sector (3 dummies) and occupation (10 dummies) where she was employed, whether she 
was in the public sector, attended any courses during the last month,  adopted active methods to search for a job, 
whether she was waiting to start a new job. All the independent variables refer to the initial situation, before the 
exit from the nonemployment pool. 
1interaction among young, a dummy equal to 1 in quarter 2004:3, and the minimum wage variation. 
2 exMW stays for EMW in columns (1) and (2); for ZMW in columns (3) and (4).  
young*EMW is the interaction among young, a dummy equal to 1 in every other quarter than 2004:3, and the 
minimum wage variation. 
young*ZMW is the interaction among young, a dummy equal to 1 in quarter 2006:1, and the minimum wage 
variation. 
3effect of the variation in the minimum wage on the former 2 quarters. 
4effect of the variation in the minimum wage on the following 2 quarters. References
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46A The model
A.1 Equilibrium conditions in state 2:
Let￿ s recall the ￿rm￿ s value function:
the job value function:
rJ2 (x) = x ￿ w2 + ￿
Z xu
d2
[J2 (s) ￿ J2 (x)]dH (s) ￿ ￿H (d2)[F + J2 (x)] (27)
the vacancy value function:
rV2 = ￿k + q2
Z xu
a2
[J2 (s) ￿ V2]dH (s) (28)
JOB DESTRUCTION:
The job destruction condition is
J2 (d2) = ￿F (29)
Subtracting 29 from 27, we get:






so that we can simplify the integral in 27, and rewrite the value function as:





(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ ￿F (32)
Valuating the value function in d2, we get the job destruction equation:





(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ rF (33)
MATCH FORMATION:
The job formation condition is
J2 (a2) = 0 (34)
Substituting condition 34 into equation 32 we get:





(s ￿ d2)dH (s) + ￿F = d2 + (r + ￿)F (35)
JOB CREATION:
The free entry condition is
V = 0 (36)
47Substituting the free entry condition into the value function of a vacancy, we get:
Z xu
a2




Furthermore, using the match formation condition and the linearity property of the job


















x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d1 [J1 (s) ￿ J1 (x)]dH (s) ￿ [￿H (d1) + ￿1][F + J1 (x)] if x < d2
x ￿ w1 + ￿
R xu
d1 [J1 (s) ￿ J1 (x)]dH (s) ￿ ￿H (d1)[F + J1 (x)] + ￿1 [J2 (x) ￿ J1 (x)] if x ￿ d2
(40)
J1 (x) is composed by two linear segments with slope 1
r+￿+￿, if x < d2, and 1
r+￿, elsewhere.
Note that the distance between J2 (x) and the second segment of J1 (x) is equal to d2￿d1
r+￿+￿.
Therefore 3 cases are possible:
A. d1 < d2 and J1 (d2) > 0, i.e. the second segment J1 (x) lies above J2 (x) and the
horizontal axis;
B. d1 < d2 and ￿F < J1 (d2) < 0, i.e. the second segment J1 (x) lies above J2 (x) and
intersects the horizontal axis;
C. d1 > d2, i.e. the second segment J1 (x) lies below J2 (x).
We can prove that the third case is impossible.
Let￿ s analyze the ￿rst two cases. After some computation, assuming d1 < d2, we can
rewrite the second segment of J1 (x) as:
(r + ￿)J1 (x) = x ￿ w1 + ￿[J2 (x) ￿ J1 (x)] ￿ ￿F + ￿[1 ￿ H (d2)]
d2 ￿ d1




r + ￿ + ￿
Z d2
d1









J1 (d2) > 0. Using condition 29, we have that J1 (d2) > 0 is equivalent to:
C = (r + ￿ + ￿)[J1 (d2) ￿ J2 (d2)] > (r + ￿ + ￿)F (42)
Let￿ s compute C using equations 41 and 32:
C = w2￿w1+
￿
r + ￿ + ￿
Z d2
d1





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿
Z xu
d2
(s ￿ d2)dH (s)
￿
(43)
We know that the second segment of J1 (x) is parallel to J2 (x) at distance d2￿d1
r+￿+￿, there-
fore it has also to be true that
C = d1 ￿ d2 (44)
JOB DESTRUCTION:
When J1 (d2) > 0, the job destruction threshold has to belong to the ￿rst segment.
Therefore, imposing the job destruction condition, we have:





d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ rF (45)
We can easily check that d1 < d2. Furthermore, substituting 33 into 45 condition 44 is
veri￿ed.
MATCH FORMATION:
Also the hiring standard has to belong to the ￿rst segment:





d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) (46)
= d1 + (r + ￿ + ￿)F
JOB CREATION:



















￿F < J1 (d2) < 0 which is equivalent to:
C < (r + ￿ + ￿)F (48)
JOB DESTRUCTION:
When ￿F < J1 (d2) < 0 the job destruction threshold has to belong to the ￿rst segment.
Therefore we can use the result from case A:





d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) ￿ rF (49)
49As for case A, condition 44 is veri￿ed.
MATCH FORMATION:
Now the hiring standard has to belong to the second segment:





d1 (s ￿ d1)dH (s)








(s ￿ d2)dH (s) + ￿F + ￿
d2 ￿ d1
r + ￿ + ￿
(50)
= d1 + (r + ￿)F + ￿
d2 ￿ d1
r + ￿ + ￿
JOB CREATION:









A.3 Impossibility of case C
Suppose that d1 > d2. Then, we can rewrite the second segment of J1 (x) as:





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿ ￿F (52)
In this case:





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿
Z xu
d2




It has also to be true that [r + ￿ + ￿][J1 (x) ￿ J2 (x)] = d1 ￿ d2, that is:





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿
Z xu
d2
(s ￿ d2)dH (s)
￿
= d1 ￿ d2 (54)
JOB DESTRUCTION:
When J1 (d2) < 0, the job destruction threshold has to belong to the ￿rst segment.
Therefore:





(s ￿ d1)dH (s) ￿ rF + ￿
d2 ￿ d1
r + ￿ + ￿
(55)
Note that d1 > d2
If we substitute (JDC
1 ) and (JD2) in condition (35), we get:












r + ￿ + ￿
= A ￿ ￿
d2 ￿ d1
r + ￿ + ￿
6= A (56)
We have proved by contradiction that case C is impossible.
50